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Résumé 
Le cerveau représente le corps de différentes manières (e.g., sensorielle, motrice) pour des 
fins différentes (e.g., se reconnaître, agir dans l'espace). Depuis un siècle maintenant, 
neuropsychologues, philosophes et neuroscientifiques ont cherché une définition 
opérationnelle des représentations du corps, proposant un vaste champ de notions distinctes 
telles que le schéma corporel, l'image corporelle, etc. Les résultats récents sur la possibilité 
d'incorporer des corps étrangers n'ont fait qu'ajouter à la complexité. En particulier, en raison 
de leurs effets sensoriels et moteurs, la main en caoutchouc et les outils peuvent être 
considérés comme tous deux incorporés, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont traités comme s'ils faisaient 
partie du corps. Mais à quel point peut-on élargir la représentation de son corps? Quelles sont 
les contraintes qui régissent l'incorporation d'objets externes? Et s'agit-il des mêmes selon que 
l'incorporation est motrice (i.e. objet intégré dans le schéma corporel) ou perceptive (i.e. 
object intégré dans l'image corporelle)? Nous confrontons ici deux domaines de recherche 
trop souvent étudiés isolément afin de mieux comprendre les lois de l'incorporation. En 
particulier, nous analysons les similitudes et les différences entre l'incorporation d'outils et 
l'incorporation de mains prosthétiques. En conclusion, nous proposons qu'elles correspondent 
à deux types d'incorporation distincts, régis par des lois différentes, mais que dans les deux 
cas, l'incorporation n'est que partielle. 
 
Abstract 
The brain represents the body in different ways (e.g., perceptual, motor) for different purposes 
(recognising oneself, acting in space). Several concepts and even more numerous labels (e.g., 
body image, body schema) have historically been proposed to define these representations in 
operational terms. Recent evidence of embodiment of external objects has added complexity 
to an already quite intricate picture. In particular, because of their perceptual and motor 
effects, both rubber hands and tools can be conceived as embodied, that is, represented in the 
brain as if they were parts of one’s own body. But are there any limits to what we can 
embody? What constraints lay upon embodiment? And are they similar both for motor 
embodiment (i.e. integration within the body schema) and for perceptual embodiment (i.e. 
integration within the body image)? Here, we consider the implications emerging from the 
different, and up-to-now relatively separate research domains of tool use and rubber hand 
illusion for understanding the rules of embodiment. In particular, we compare what the 
embodiment of tools and prostheses may or may not have in common. We conclude that in 
both cases, although for different reasons and with different constraints, embodiment is only 
partial. 
 
 
 
Mots clés : Image corporelle, schéma corporel, plasticité, utilisation d’outils, illusion de la 
main en caoutchouc 
Key words: body image, body schema, plasticity, tool use, Rubber Hand Illusion 
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 “The lower animals keep all their limbs at home in their own bodies, but many of 
man’s are loose, and lie about detached, now here and now there, in various parts 
of the world—some being kept always handy for contingent use, and others being 
occasionally hundreds of miles away.  A machine is merely a supplementary limb; 
this is the be all and end all of machinery.  We do not use our own limbs other 
than as machines; and a leg is only a much better wooden leg than any one can 
manufacture. Observe a man digging with a spade; his right fore-arm has become 
artificially lengthened, and his hand has become a joint.” Butler en 1872 [1, p. 
267] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In normal speech, we often refer to tools as parts of the bodily self (e.g., I am parked at the 
corner of Broadway and Houston). But this may be more than a mere linguistic shortcut. Has 
it never happened to you to bend your head when driving under a bridge of low height, thus 
confusing the dimensions of your car with your own bodily dimensions? Does this confusion 
reveal that tools and machines are "merely supplementary limbs", that is, that they are 
processed by the brain in the same way as biological arms and legs? What is at stake here is to 
determine the extent of the plasticity of the representation of one's body. On the basis of 
recent experimental evidence, it has been claimed that body representations can stretch to 
include allograft, prostheses, rubber hands, virtual avatars and tools. Hence, what is embodied 
can be in flesh and blood, in rubber, in metals, or even completely virtual. It may be 
anatomically shaped or not. It may be controlled, or internally felt, or both. But do all those 
various phenomena of embodiment involve one and the same mechanism?  
Here, we shall focus on the contrast between tool use and the now classic rubber hand 
illusion (RHI), which has rarely been directly investigated experimentally [2]. Briefly, in the 
classical set-up of the RHI, participants sit with their left arm resting on a table, hidden 
behind a screen. They are asked to fixate at a rubber hand presented in front of them, and the 
experimenter simultaneously strokes with two paintbrushes both the participant’s hand and 
the fake hand. Participants report feeling as if they were touched on the rubber hand and as if 
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the rubber hand were part of their body. They mislocate their biological hand in direction of 
the rubber hand (i.e. proprioceptive drift). Here again, it seems that the rubber hand is "merely 
a supplementary limb". Yet, a difference between the tool and the rubber hand immediately 
strikes us: tools are rarely experienced as if they belonged to oneself in the same way as 
rubber hands do. As Botvinick [3, p. 783] noticed, “the feeling of ownership that we have for 
our bodies clearly does not extend to, for example, the fork we use at dinner”. A further 
difference is that tools are said to extend the body, while rubber hands are said to be 
incorporated [4]. Finally, many variations of the original set-up of the RHI have investigated 
the constraints that lay upon the illusion. Among other findings (see Table 1), they reveal that 
one cannot induce the illusion if the rubber hand is replaced by a piece of wood or a tool 
[5,6]. In addition to spatio-temporal congruency between the tactile stimulations, it has been 
suggested that a so-called 'body model' constrains the visual capture of touch [7], and overall 
the sense of bodily ownership. Although the description of the body model is often left 
incomplete, a minimal requirement seems to be that it represents a template of the anatomical 
structure of a human body. 
To sum up, we face an apparent paradox. On the one hand, there seems to be a large 
flexibility of what one can embody that seems to go beyond any anatomical constraints; on 
the other hand, there seems to be a very narrow window of what can be embodied, highly 
constrained by the anatomy of the human body. In this paper, we shall review the similarities 
and differences between the RHI and tool use.  
 
1. The 'body model' hypothesis  
According to Armel and Ramachandran [8], mere spatio-temporal congruency of visuo-tactile 
stimulations suffices to induce the RHI, whatever the object visually presented. That would 
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suggest that strong statistical correlations between different sensory modalities are sufficient 
conditions for deceiving our brains and that any object can be processed as if it were a part of 
one's body (i.e. embodied). However, all the following RHI studies show that there are some 
further constraints beside mere statistical correlations. In particular, there is no significant 
difference between asynchronous and synchronous conditions if the visually presented object 
does not look like a hand.  On the basis of such findings, it has been repetitively argued that 
the RHI is modulated by something like a pre-existing body model, which represents the 
spatial organization of the body [7,9,10]. One can further enlarge this view and defend what 
we call the body model hypothesis. On this view, embodiment must respect some basic 
anatomical constraints. Therefore, only some objects under certain circumstances can be 
processed as if they were parts of one's body.  
Although the description of the body model is often left incomplete, a minimal 
requirement seems to be that it represents a template of the anatomical structure of the human 
body. This body model corresponds to what has been identified in the philosophical literature 
as a long-term body image [11], and in the neuropsychological literature as visuo-spatial body 
representation [12], or body structural description [13]. It represents the long-term properties 
of one's body such as the spatial configuration and the metrics of body parts (i.e., their 
boundaries, their proximity and their position relative to each other). The body model plays a 
structural role in spatially shaping bodily experiences. It is said to be impaired in patients with 
autototopagnosia, who can no longer point to parts of their body that are named, touched or 
shown. 
Whether one calls it body model, long-term body image or body structural description, it is 
supposed to determine what can or cannot be embodied. In other words, only objects that 
meet the description given in the body model can be processed as if they were parts of one's 
body. In favour of the body model hypothesis, we shall now review the constraints that lay 
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upon the RHI, and more specifically the anatomical constraints. They can be summarized as 
follows (see table 1).  
 
Constraints References 
Temporal Synchronous stimulations 
(less than 300ms delay) 
e.g. Botvinick & Cohen 
(1998) [14] 
Shimada et al. (2009) [15] 
Location of RH less than 
30 cm far from BH 
e.g. Loyd (2007) [16] 
Position of the RH aligned 
with BH  
e.g. Pavani et al. (2000) 
[17] 
Tsakiris & Haggard 
(2005) [10] 
 
 
Spatial 
Direction of stroking 
congruent in hand-centred 
frame 
e.g. Costantini & Haggard 
(2007) [9] 
Hand-shaped e.g. Tsakiris et al. (2010) 
[5] 
Identical hand laterality e.g. Tsakiris & Haggard 
(2005) [10] 
 
Anatomical 
Size of RH similar or 
bigger than of BH 
e.g. Pavani & Zampini 
(2007) [18] 
 
Table 1. Constraints that lay upon the RHI (RH: rubber hand; BH: biological hand) 
 
Based on these results, we can draw two conclusions. On the one hand, there seems to be a 
clear anatomical constraint such that one can embody only objects that are anatomically 
identical to the body part that is stroked. Of particular interest for us is the fact that no 
significant difference between synchronous and asynchronous stroking was found when the 
rubber hand was replaced by a wooden spoon, or any object that was not looking like a hand. 
On the other hand, there is no need for objects to be embodied to look like one's own body 
parts. Indeed, visual similarity between the rubber hand and the biological hand (e.g., skin 
luminance, the specific shape of the hand) does not affect the RHI [19]. Furthermore, a recent 
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study showed the possibility to induce RHI for the whole body (i.e. full-body illusion through 
virtual reality) for a virtual avatar of a different gender [20]. Hence, the body model does not 
even seem to prevent gender transfer in full body illusions. The only study that points towards 
a certain self-specificity shows that there is no RHI if the participants see a rubber hand that is 
smaller than their own hand [18]. However, there is no influence if the rubber hand is bigger. 
Hence, we can conclude that to some extent the body model that constrains the RHI is not 
very fine-grained. It carries information more about the human body in general than about the 
subject's individual bodily parameters.  
Here, we shall propose that there may be even less anatomical constraints upon the RHI 
than suggested by the body model hypothesis. Arguably, the body model must respect some 
biological constraints such that for instance, visual information about a left hand cannot be 
integrated with somatosensory information about a right hand. Another constraint may be that 
there can be only two hands represented, a left hand and a right hand, and no more. If so, one 
should expect the embodiment of the rubber hand to be associated with a disembodiment of 
the biological hand, as if the biological hand were replaced by the artificial counterpart. 
However, as we shall see now, these two basic anatomical constraints are not always 
respected by the RHI.  
Let us start with the laterality issue. There are two distinct questions that may be raised. 
First, it has been observed that denial of ownership is largely due to right- compared to left-
brain damage. Is this asymmetry reflected at the level of the RHI? It was shown that when 
exposed to left and right rubber hands (with respectively their left and right biological hands 
stroked), neurotypical participants experienced the RHI as comparably vivid, but their skin 
conductance responses were larger in case of left rubber hands [21]. One way to interpret 
these results is that one can embody both left and right hands, but the implicit ownership is 
stronger for left rubber hands. The authors concluded that this asymmetry reflects a right 
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hemisphere dominance for the sense of (rubber) body ownership. One may thus speculate that 
the body model, if body model there is, is localized in the right hemisphere. A second 
question concerns the laterality constraint. Does laterality difference between the rubber hand 
and the biological hand impact the RHI? A positive answer to this question was initially 
offered by Tsakiris and Haggard [10], who found no RHI when a right rubber hand was 
visually presented while the left biological hand was stroked. However, Petkova and Ehrsson 
[22] were recently able to induce the RHI with such difference in laterality. A right rubber 
hand was placed on the table, while the right biological hand was hidden behind a screen. The 
left biological hand was placed in full view, but participants were instructed to look at the 
rubber hand. Both the left biological hand and the right rubber hand were stroked. Despite the 
incongruence between the hand laterality, participants reported feeling touch on the rubber 
hand and displayed a proprioceptive drift. The only difference with the normal RHI was that 
it was more difficult to elicit (i.e. longer stimulation time and illusion on less participants). It 
therefore seems that the RHI violates the hand laterality constraint posited by the body model.  
What about the two-hand constraint? That amputees can incorporate a prosthesis is not 
surprising as it replaces, so to speak, the missing limb. It fills the gap. What is more surprising 
is that individuals with their already complete body can incorporate a rubber hand as well. 
One way to account for the RHI is on the model of amputees. In other words, the 'embodied' 
rubber limb replaces the biological limb so that people experience only two limbs, one of 
them being fake. As for the biological limb, it becomes temporarily excluded from the body 
model. Alternatively, one can account of such artificial embodiment on the model of 
supernumerary limbs. Some patients experience the presence of phantom hands or legs, in 
addition of their own biological hands and legs. One may suggest that at one level, they 
represent their own body with three or even four hands or legs. If so, there are some degrees 
of liberty relative to the anatomical template of the human body. One can embody more than 
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two hands. Alternatively, patients with supernumerary limbs may have two distinct body 
models, one representing the phantom limbs, and the other representing the biological limbs. 
The body model then respects the two-hand constraint, but it can be duplicated. In any case, 
both interpretations show that one can embody a supernumerary limb (whether a phantom 
limb or a rubber limb) at no cost for the biological limbs.   
One way to assess the two models of the RHI is to investigate the fate of the biological 
hand during the RHI. However, the results are controversial. In questionnaires, participants 
slightly disagree when asked if they felt as if their hand had disappeared (-0.4 in the 
synchronous condition and -0.8 in the asynchronous condition, in [23], negative score 
representing the level of disagreement and positive score representing the level of agreement), 
but they also disagree when asked if they felt as if they had three hands (-1.6 in the 
synchronous condition and -1.8 in the asynchronous condition, idem). At the physiological 
and behavioural level, it was found a decrease in skin temperature of the biological hand 
following the RHI, as well as a slowing down of tactile processes [24,25]. These results have 
been interpreted by Moseley and colleagues [24] as evidence that the participant’s biological 
hand is disembodied and replaced by the artificial counterpart. However, similar tactile 
performance has been found by Folegatti and colleagues [25] following prismatic 
displacement independently of any disembodiment. Like in the RHI, prismatic displacement 
involves a cross-modal mismatch between the seen and felt position of the hand. However, 
unlike the RHI, there is no fake hand involved here, only one’s own hand seen at a different 
location than where it is felt to be located thanks to prismatic goggles. Yet, a similar slowing 
down of tactile processes was found, which should thus be related to visuo-proprioceptive 
conflict rather than to disembodiment [25]. In a nutshell, it is not clear yet whether the rubber 
hand is merely a supernumerary limb added to one’s own two biological hands, or whether it 
somehow replaces the participant’s biological hand.  
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Another way to answer to the question of two-hand constraint is to investigate not the 
disembodiment of the biological hand, but the possibility to simultaneously embody multiple 
rubber hands. Ehrsson [26] reported the illusory duplication of the right hand in subjects 
exposed to two adjacent right rubber hands. Participants were shown two rubber hands placed 
side by side above their biological hand, which was hidden behind the table. After 
synchronous stroking of the three hands (i.e., the two rubber hands and the biological hand), 
they reported feeling the touch on both rubber hands. Furthermore, they reported feeling 
ownership towards both rubber hands. When shown a needle stubbed in the rubber hands, 
they showed a larger skin conductance response after synchronous than asynchronous 
condition.  
To conclude, there may be less anatomical constraints upon the RHI that assumed by the 
body model hypothesis. This may even leave open the possibility of inducing the RHI for 
tool. Indeed, if one can embody three hands or even four, why not embody a tool as well? The 
illusion may be subtler to capture and take more time to induce, like in Petvoka and Ehrsson's 
study on laterality [22], but there is no argument yet that forbids it. However, we do not want 
to say that there are no constraints besides spatio-temporal congruency, or that there is no 
body model that plays a role for the RHI. Rather, these results invite us to be more careful and 
more precise in our specification of the body model. In particular, one may accommodate the 
possibility of embodiment of more than two hands if the body model recruited by the RHI is 
conceived as the representation not of the unified whole body, but rather of isolated parts of 
the body. On this view, all that is required for the RHI is that information drawn from vision 
and touch is assigned to the same object, namely, the hand. This principle is well known in 
the literature on multimodal integration as the assumption of unity [27]. Only signals that are 
assigned to the same individual are integrated together. The extent of the integration depends 
on the reliability of the assumption. The reliability is a function of the number of properties 
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that are congruent relative to the weighting assigned to these properties (e.g., identical skin 
luminance is less important than identical posture). The assumption of unity requires a body 
model in order to identify the common source of the information drawn from the various 
sensory modalities, but it is a more local body model, restricted to the body part, and it is a 
more flexible and dynamic assumption that the body model hypothesis. Finally, one can offer 
a computational model of the assumption of unity in Bayesian terms [28]. What is interesting 
with Bayesian models is that they provide a model of understanding of how the context and 
the functional role (e.g., action versus perception) can affect not only multimodal integration, 
but also embodiment, as we shall see now with tool use.  
 
2. The embodiment of tool 
There are more and more studies that show that tools are integrated in the representation of 
one’s own body. As Head and Holmes [29] noted a century ago, “Anything which participates 
in the conscious movement of our bodies is added to the model of ourselves and becomes part 
of those schemata: a woman’s power of localization may extend to the feather of her hat”. 
Since then, a number of studies have addressed the possibility that tools are embodied and it 
is nowadays largely accepted that tool-use affects spatial perception, motor imagery and even 
time perception. What is still highly debated though, is which (if a single) body representation 
is modified to embody tools, as well as which kind of tools (if any) can be literally embodied. 
Most effects that have been reported in normal and pathological cases after tool use concern 
multisensory processing. However, it remains unclear whether the multisensory effects can be 
genuinely ascribed to a change in body representation and/or in the processing of the 
peripersonal space (for discussion, see [30,31]. In other words, do tools enlarge the space of 
actions or the space of one's body, or both? And do they do so in the same way as rubber 
hands? 
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Peripersonal space (PpS) consists of a region immediately surrounding the body (i.e., the 
personal space), which is characterized by a higher degree of multisensory integration 
between visual, tactile and auditory information as compared to farther regions of space [32-
34]. The representation of such a narrow sector of space is grounded on the activity of 
multisensory neurons that have been physiologically identified in the monkey [35] and whose 
human counterpart has been recently reported with imaging techniques [36]. After Iriki and 
colleagues’ seminal work [37], showing an expansion of PpS after monkeys used a rake to 
retrieve distant objects, the Pps is thought to constitute a privileged interface for the body to 
interact with nearby objects [38,39], and particularly via the use of tools, which allow for 
instance to retrieve objects that would otherwise be out of reach. Echoing the basic pre-post 
tool-use paradigm originally devised for monkey model, it has been shown that perceptual 
deficits of neurological patients can be modulated (i.e., improved or worsened) during or 
immediately after tool-use [40-42], as can be normal perception in neurotypical participants 
[31,43,44]. However, it has recently become clear that tool-use is not necessary to obtain 
perceptual changes in the Pps. When asked to jointly perform visuo-tactile discrimination and 
reach-to-grasp tasks, neurotypical subjects manifest fast on-line changes in their perceptual 
capabilities that are triggered by movement onset. Importantly, free-hand actions bring about 
such changes, thus demonstrating multisensory plasticity is not dependent upon the use of 
tools [38,39].  
That tools can enlarge the peripersonal space is now widely accepted. But do they also 
affect the personal space? This is more controversial. As we shall see, there are two sets of 
studies, which respectively show sensory effects and motor effects. We shall argue that it is 
only in the latter case that tools can qualify as embodied.  
It has been recently shown that visual perception is enhanced (i.e., detection reaction times 
are shorter) when visual stimuli are projected on the subjects’ visible hand or on a similarly 
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looking rubber hand, but not when projected on a 5-fingered gardening tool [45; see also 46-
48]. However, when subjects were re-tested after being trained in using either the fake hand 
or the gardening tool, their detection capabilities were improved in both cases (i.e., both after 
using a fake hand and a tool), bringing the authors to state “..that training makes it more likely 
that objects such as a fake hand or tool will be incorporated in the body schema.” [45, p. 
2461]. Intriguingly, important differences were nevertheless found. The training with the 
gardening rake improved detection for stimuli projected both on the fake hand and tool. 
Paradigmatic of the confusion between peripersonal and personal space, the same paper 
closes by stating “Altogether, these training-induced effects showing on improved detection 
speed can be interpreted as evidence that the peripersonal space is not fixed, but can be 
dynamically and rapidly re-mapped following tool-use.” [45, p. 2462]. Unfortunately, no 
information can be derived regarding any potential sense of ownership for the fake hand or 
tool, as no questionnaire or other objective measures of illusion of ownerships were included 
in the study. 
Using a slightly different approach, Press and colleagues investigated whether it is possible 
to identify electrophysiological markers of the embodiment of rubber hands vs. rubber objects 
[49]. An enhanced early (N140) somatosensory component was indeed found after 
synchronous vs. asynchronous visuo-tactile training (typically used in RHI paradigms). This 
enhancement, however, was present irrespective of whether subjects were looking at the 
rubber hand, or a non hand-shaped rubber object. Given its unspecific feature, this 
somatosensory component may actually represent the counterpart of the multisensory 
integrative component of the RHI, which is told to be necessary, but not sufficient for sense 
of ownership to emerge. Again, no subjective or objective indices of ownership were included 
in this study, thus leaving any possible parallel with the RHI studies a bit indirect. In addition, 
possibly because of the methodological differences with respect to the study by Kao & 
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Goodale [45], here visual discriminative performance was not found to be enhanced when 
visual stimuli were presented on rubber hands compared to rubber objects, rendering any 
possible link with the features of Pps even more speculative.        
In a nutshell, tools use alters the processing of sensory events in the peripersonal space and 
in the personal space. However, these results per se do not show that tool use alters the 
representation of one's body, less even of the body schema (representation of one's body for 
action, see section 3 for more details), although this conclusion has been repetitively drawn. 
In the attempt to test directly whether tool-use dynamically modifies body representations, 
Cardinali and colleagues [50] recently analysed the spatio-temporal profile of the movements 
in neurotypical participants performing one of the simplest motor acts, namely grasping an 
object with their hand. Subjects were then engaged in the use of a commercial mechanical 
grabber to grasp the same object. When subsequently re-tested while reaching to grasp with 
their hand alone, the kinematics of participants’ transport phase of their movements was 
significantly modified. Not only they took a longer time to achieve the maximal acceleration, 
velocity and deceleration during the approaching phase to the target object, but the maximal 
amplitude of these parameters was reduced. These changes were selective for the reaching 
phase, as the pre-shaping of the hand to accurately grasp the object was not affected. When 
considered with respect to the length of the participants’ arm, this pattern of results 
corresponds to the difference that is naturally present between long- and short-armed subjects: 
‘long-arm’ subjects will show longer latencies and reduced amplitudes compared to ‘short-
arm’ subjects when grasping the same target object. This finding suggests not only that tool-
use does indeed modify the body representation for action (i.e., the body schema, see section 
3), but also that it does so by increasing the represented length of the subject’s arm. If this 
were true, such a personal change would impact the kinematics of other actions that are 
sensitive to the arm length, even if they were not explicitly trained during the tool-use training 
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session. For example, if tool-use ‘extends’ the arm length, this should generalize to 
movements such as pointing on top of objects, instead of grasping them, as the pointing 
movement is devoid of the grip-formation component of the movement (not affected by tool-
use), but contains the transport component of the trained movement (selectively affected by 
tool-use and sensitive to arm-length). This prediction was entirely confirmed by further 
results from our study: subjects showed a virtually identical pattern of post tool-use changes 
in kinematics, irrespective of whether they grasped or merely pointed the target objects [50]. 
What should be additionally noted is that these changes take place rapidly and without 
requiring learning processes. Contrary to typical sensorimotor adaptation to prisms or force 
fields [51,52], no trace of learning was detected in the kinematics of subjects during the four 
blocks of tool-use, and this despite the fact that none of them have had previous experience 
with that given mechanical grabber. Humans are proficient tool-users, it would make an 
obvious phylogenic advantage to have developed a body representation that allows one to 
immediately “tune” the motor control requirements to the physical and mechanical 
characteristics of a novel tool.   
Overall, the effects on movement kinematics reported above can be taken to say tool-use 
modifies the motor side of the body representation. Does this imply that the representation of 
the body morphology is affected also when testing unconscious and implicit aspects of body 
knowledge such as the way arm-length is represented at a somatosensory level? To answer 
this question, we asked neurotypical participants to point to tactually stimulated parts (middle 
finger-tip, wrist, elbow) of their right forearm (involved in tool-use) with their right forefinger 
(not involved in tool-use). To derive subjects’ internally represented length of their hand and 
forearm, we computed the distance between pointing to the middle finger-tip and wrist, and 
between wrist and elbow. These distance measures were then compared before and 
immediately after an identical tool-use session, revealing that after tool-use subjects pointed 
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to locations that were farther apart, as if their arm were physically longer (see, for details, 
[50]).      
There are therefore not only perceptual, but more profound motor and somatosensory 
consequences when one uses a tool. In this respect, we suggested this is a direct 
demonstration that tool-use does indeed change what we have so far called the body schema. 
Even more intriguingly, the effects of this plastic modification in the body schema seem to 
last long enough to be detected after the change itself has occurred, most likely during the 
tool-use phase. We believe that, in contrast to the previous putative changes of the body 
schema, it is when the consequences of using a tool affect the representation of our acting 
body that the tool “becomes a part” of the body. This direct measure of changes in the body 
schema may thus provide a new sensitive test to verify whether changes in the body schema 
invariably imply changes in the multisensory processing of peripersonal space, or they can be 
dissociated [30]. 
 
3. The manifold of embodiment 
To recap, the question we started from was what can be embodied. It is hardly intuitive 
that one can embody anything. There must be some constraints, but which ones? Although the 
RHI may seem at first sight highly constrained, we showed that the anatomy of a template 
human body does not always need to be respected. Furthermore, we showed that tools do not 
merely enlarge the space of action, but are really integrated in the representation of one's 
body. Hence, both rubber hands and tools can be embodied, but one still needs to account for 
their differences. Do they result merely from distinct triggering mechanisms, a perceptual 
mechanism and a motor mechanism, or do they reflect distinct types of embodiment?  
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Most versions of the RHI are purely perceptual, both because of the input (i.e. passive 
tactile stimulation) and because of the task (i.e. introspective report and perceptual judgment 
of the hand location). On the other hand, the embodiment of tools results from active training 
and use. One may then suggest that perceptual trigger and motor trigger cause two 
functionally distinct types of embodiment. An object is perceptually embodied if it is 
processed as if it were a part of one's body for perceptual tasks. An object is motorically 
embodied if it is processed as if it were a part of one's body for motor tasks. Another way to 
characterize this distinction is in terms of the representations of the body that they involve. It 
is classically assumed that there are at least two types of body representations [53-55]. The 
body schema consists in sensorimotor representations based on afferent and efferent 
information, which guide bodily movements. The body image groups all the other 
representations about the body that are not used for action, whether they are perceptual, 
conceptual or emotional (body percept, body concept and body affect, cf. [56]). Although 
controversial (for review, see [57]), this distinction may be of interest to analyse the 
differences between rubber hand embodiment and tool embodiment. Perceptual embodiment 
consists in representing the object within the body image, whereas motor embodiment 
consists in representing the object within the body schema. We are far now from the body 
model hypothesis. Rather than a template of a human body within which an object can be 
integrated or not, there are two distinct body representations, each with their own functional 
role, but also possibly each with their own dynamics and their own constraints.  
Perceptual embodiment and motor embodiment are always associated when it comes to 
one's biological body, even for parts of the body that cannot move. Indeed, one needs to take 
into account the boundaries of the complete body and its peripersonal space if one does not 
want to bump into objects. Yet, perceptual embodiment and motor embodiment can be 
dissociable, as shown by the following studies on the RHI and on tools.  
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As said before, most RHI studies ask participants to report the location of their unseen 
stimulated hand. The measured proprioceptive drift reflects perceptual embodiment of the 
rubber hand. But is the rubber hand also motorically embodied? In questionnaires, 
participants report low feeling of control over the rubber hand [23]. This is confirmed by the 
fact that action is immune to the RHI [58]. Participants were asked to indicate the felt position 
of their hand by providing motor responses (e.g., reaching the stimulated hand with the 
contralateral hand, reaching the contralateral hand with the stimulated hand, and grasping a 
stick with the two hands). We found no significant difference in the kinematics after 
asynchronous and synchronous stimulations. In other words, there was no proprioceptive drift 
for any of the motor responses. Even more convincing, and maybe more surprising, is the 
independence of the perceptual and motor responses. When participants were asked a second 
time to give a perceptual judgment about their hand location after having moved, they were 
still sensitive to the RHI. One way to interpret these results is that the rubber hand is 
perceptually embodied, but not motorically.  
The distinction between the two types of embodiment cannot be reduced to the distinction 
between the two types of triggering mechanism, multimodal integration versus action. Indeed, 
some versions of the RHI studies use active tactile stimulation, rather than passive (e.g. 
participants actively stroked the bristles of a toothbrush with their unseen biological hand 
while seeing the rubber hand performing the same movement, synchronously or not). This 
motor version of the RHI reduces the extent of the RHI [59], but for all that, it does not 
increase motor embodiment [60]. In addition, motor embodiment may be more constrained 
than perceptual embodiment. A recent study using active stimulation and two rubber hands 
replicated Ehrsson's results, showing perceptual embodiment of the two rubber hands, but 
also found a lack of motor embodiment of the two rubber hands [61]. When asked to reach a 
target with their hand, the trajectory was not deviated when the three hands were stroked 
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synchronously, showing thus that the motor system used the coordinates of the biological 
hand to plan the movement. To conclude, it is not because embodiment is caused by action 
that it has consequences for action.  
We have seen that the rubber hand can be perceptually embodied without being 
motorically embodied. Conversely, we would like to suggest that tools can be motorically 
embodied without being perceptually embodied. A recent paper by Povinelli and colleagues 
[62] argues that we do not literally processed tools as if it were part of our body because we 
use tools in situations where we would not use our own body, for instance like using a stick to 
stoke a campfire, or stir a pot of boiling soup with a wooden spoon. They showed that even 
chimpanzees keep discrete representations of their own hands and of the tools such that they 
select to use a tool, rather than their hands, when acting in potentially hazardous 
circumstances located within reach. However, there is a different way to interpret their results, 
namely, that the tools are embodied but only motorically, and not perceptually. In other 
words, the body image is said to include not only body percept, but also body affect. 
Numerous RHI studies have shown that if one threatens the rubber hand with a hammer or a 
needle, participants react affectively as measured by the increase of skin conduction reaction, 
as if their own hand was threatened. Hence, it seems that an object needs to be perceptually 
embodied for one to react affectively towards it. The fact that chimpanzees and humans prefer 
to use tools in dangerous situations may show that the tools are not perceptually embodied, 
although motorically embodied. Since the body schema can be conceived of as the 
representation the brain uses to plan and execute actions, and tools are actively manipulated, it 
becomes intuitive to relate tool embodiment to the body schema instead of the body image 
[63]. This has been confirmed by the results previously described [50]. The privileged link to 
action is also reflected in the fact that tools alter the peripersonal space, that is, the space of 
action. Alternatively, one may argue that one selects to use parts of the body that are the best 
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fit for the task, and the truth is that tools are better fit than human or chimp hands in these 
situations. This has nothing to do with keeping tools outside the representation of one's body.  
To conclude, perceptual embodiment and motor embodiment may follow different rules, 
based on the functional roles of the body representations within which external objects are 
integrated. Arguably, what is required for action is not the same as what is required for 
perception. This is not necessarily to say that motor embodiment may be more flexible than 
motor embodiment. True, tools can be motorically embodied, while it is still an open question 
whether it can be perceptually embodied. On the other hand, multiple rubber hands can be 
perceptually embodied, while they cannot be motorically embodied.  
 
Conclusion: a partial embodiment 
While most of the literature focuses exclusively on tools or on rubber hands, we think that 
it is a more fruitful approach to compare and integrate the results in both domains. This may 
indeed help us to understand what is at stake in embodiment. In particular, it is of clinical 
interest in order to improve the quality of embodiment of allograft and prostheses in 
amputees. We would like to conclude with a last remark. Until now, we have assumed that an 
object is embodied if it is processed as if it were a part of one's body. But this description 
seems to imply that all properties of the object are processed as if they were properties of 
one’s own body. And this is not true. First, we have seen that this depends on the tasks, 
whether perceptual or motor. But even within perceptual embodiment, not all the perceptual 
properties of the objects are necessarily processed as if they were properties of one's body. 
For instance, the location of the rubber hand is processed as if it were the location of one’s 
own hand, but not its visual appearance. Hence, the rubber hand is not embodied to the same 
extent as one's biological hand. This difference may explain why the rubber hand does not 
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replace the biological hand: the rubber hand is not embodied enough to take over the 
biological hand. Similarly, motor embodiment can be more or less partial. Tools alter the 
representation of one's body for action, but only for a short period of time. But action requires 
the representation of one's long-term bodily parameters (e.g., size, strength, etc.) to be 
flexible: it should quickly and temporarily change to fit the novel needs imposed by a given 
tool. It should also change to allow for a quick recovery of the ‘default’ parameters, probably 
stored in a longer-term body schema when freed from novel constraints. We suggest 
prolonged, proficient tool-use may neurally translate into either more stable changes in the 
default parameters (longer-lasting plastic changes), or rapid contextually-based access to 
separate representations (default=standard body vs. augmented=std. body + tool). We would 
like to suggest that the lack of long-term motor embodiment explains the absence of feeling of 
ownership towards tools [64].  
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